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ABSTRACT 
Conditions have been given elsewhere which guarantee that 
binary decision procedures have a simple structure. Here we show that 
a continuity requirement together with some weak algebraic regularity 
conditions ensures that a binary procedure is locally simple. Additional 
topological assump tions are given which require that the binary procedure 
is a simple game. 
CONTINUOUS-V ALUED BINARY DECISION PROCEDURES 
John A. Ferejohn, David M. Grether * 
Steven A. Matthews and Edward W. Packel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function maps each n-tuple 
of continuous individual preference orderings into a continuous, transitive 
binary relation over alternative states of an economy. .Arrow and his 
successors dropped the continuity requirement and demanded instead that 
the social ordering vary in a natural way with individual preferences. 
These requirements, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and 
citizen sovereignty axioms, together with the requirement that the 
social preference relation satisfy transitivity or some weaker ration-
ality condition, imply either that power is concentrated to an extreme 
extent or that the social choice process is indecisive. 
In this paper we eliminate the transitivity assumption 
employed in the Bergson-Samuelson formulation and instead concentrate 
on the axiom that the social preference relation be continuous. 
Specifically, we examine the nature of a function that maps each 
n-tuple of individual preferences into a continuous binary relation that 
does not necessarily satisfy any rationality condition. 'When this 
function depends in a "natural" way on individual preferences, we show 
that power, although not necessarily concentrated, is distributed in a 
dichotomous fashion among individuals; each coalition can either determine 
the social preference relation on every pair of alternatives or on no 
*The authors would like to thank Peter Hammond and an anonymous referee 
for their helpful comments. Support from National Science Foundation 
Grants SOC78-24787 and SOC79-07366 is gratefully acknowledged. 
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pair of alternatives. Furthermore, any alternative x will be socially 
pref erred to an alternative y only if those who pref er x to y constitute 
one of the powerful coalitions. Thus, such procedures have the form 
of a simple game. 
The primary way in which our procedures depend on individual 
preferences is to satisfy binaryness. Binaryness, a weak form of 
Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, requires that 
the social preference on any two-alternative subset depend only on 
individual preferences on that subset. Many well-known social choice 
procedures and game theoretic solution concepts satisfy binariness. 
Among these processes are those satisfying the weak axiom of revealed 
preference, the core-selecting and the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
solution selecting choice functions [3], and Schwartz's GOCHA set [4]. 
It is known that any binary procedure is characterized by 
a decisiveness structure which describes the powers of all coalitions [l]. 
It turns out that the decisiveness structure needed to obtain this 
characterization is generally large and complex. However, some 
familiar binary procedures are simply characterized by the family of 
11winning11 subsets. The best known example is, of course, absolute 
majority rule in which society chooses x over y if and only if a 
majority strictly prefers x to y. In [l] conditions on binary 
procedures are given that indicate when a family of winning sets 
completely describes the behavior of a binary procedure. 
In this pa.per the characterization in terms of winning sets 
will be obtained when the social preference relation satisfies the 
following continuity property. Define an asym etric binary relation P 
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on a topological space X to be continuous if P is open in X © X. 
Equivalently, if R is the reflexive completion of P, P and R are 
continuous if R is closed in X@X. If P is continuous then for each x, 
P(x) - {y e X !-xRy} and Q(x) = {y e x ! -yRx} are open. The converse 
is however, not generally true. We now give two examples to provide 
additional motivation. 
Example 1: (Absolute Majority Rule) 
For each pair of alternatives x, y e X, society has XPy 
(x strictly over y) if and only if a majority strictly prefers x to y. 
Suppose individual preference orderings are continuous, and that 
xPy. Then there is a neighborhood U of (x,y) in x@x such that a 
majority prefers u to v for any (u,v) E U. Hence uPv for any 
(u,v) e:: U, which shows that P is open in x@x. Thus absolute majority 
rule is a continuous binary relation when individual preferences are 
continuous. 
Example 2: (Simple Majority Rule) 
Under this voting rule, xPy if and only if more individuals 
prefer x to y than prefer y to x. Let the space of alternatives X 
be the plane R2 endowed with its Euclidean topology. The set P(y) 
need not be open even if each Pi(y) is, as can be seen from the following 
three person example. 
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' 
Let individuals 1, 2 and 3 have indifference curves as shown in the 
figure and note that, under simple majority rule, x e P(y). Now take 
a sequence of alternatives {wn} in the shaded region converging to x 
and note that wn E X - P(y) for each n. If P(y) were open the limit 
of {wn} would have to be contained in X - P(y), a contradiction. For 
a similar example and restrictions on preferences which ensure that 
simple majority rule is continuous see Kelly [2]. 
Example 2 indicates that COlllJnOn procedures can aggregate 
continuous preferences into discontinuous binary relations. By 
comparison with example 1 we see that one source of discontinuity is 
that the choice procedure decides "too often. " It turns out that this 
property of deciding "too often" is what makes the associated 
decisiveness structures (or constitutions) complicated. It hardly needs 
to be mentioned in this context that absolute majority rule is a simple 
game whereas "simple" majority rule is not. 
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II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
Let X denote a set of alternatives and T a topology for X, 
such that (X,T) is Hausdorff and has the property that all nonempty 
open sets contain infinitely many elements. Let N = {1,2, . • .  n} be a 
finite set of individuals with each i £ N possessing a preference 
relation R 1 that is contained in a set n1 of admissible reflexive 
binary relations on X. For each Ri £ n1 we denote the asymmetric and 
symmetric parts by P1 and I1 respectively. 
Let D = {(x,y) E X@X[x my} be the diagonal of X@X. We 
assume that each Qi satisfies the following two domain conditions: 
Dl. Given any (x,y) E x@x - D, there exists an open 
neighborhood U of (x,y) and binary relations {R1,R2,R3} c n. - 1 
satisfying, for every (u,v) £ U, 
1 2 3 uP v, uI v, and vP u. 
D2. Given any (x,y) E: x@x - D, and sequences {xn} _::, X - {x} and 
{y } c X -{y} such that x + x and y + y. Then there exists n - n n 
RE: n., a subsequence {u } of {x } ,  and a subsequence {v} of l. n n n 
{yn} for which 
xiy and unPvn for all n. 
Property Dl has two important aspects: (1) it allows indifference 
sets to have interiors, and (2) it allows any ordering of any pair of 
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alternatives. Thus, if X �Rm then, domains consisting of only strictly 
convex preferences, individualistic (selfish) preferences, and monotone 
("more is better") preferences fail to satisfy Dl. Property D2 is, to our 
knowledge, new to the literature. We shall show in a subsequent section 
that Dl and D2 are satisfied if n1 contains preference relations 
satisfying a weak convexity condition. 
A binary decision rule is a mapping F of Q "' n1@u2@ ... @ Qn 
into asymmetric binary relations that satisfies 
Binaryness: \f'IT, 'IT' £ Q and (x,y) £ X@X, [xPiy� xPj_y and 
yP.x- yP'.x V i  E NJ.,,. [xF(-rr)y- xF(-rr')y and yF(-rr)x- yF(-rr')x] . 1 1 
When there is no danger of ambiguity, F(TI) shall be denoted as P and 
the reflexive completion of F(n) as R. F is continuous-valued at (x2y) 
if for any 'IT £ n, xPy implies the existence of a neighborhood V of 
(x,y) such that uPv for all (u,v) E: V. F is continuous-valued if F 
is continuous-valued at each (x,y) E x@x, i.e., if F maps n into 
continuous binary relations. 
It was shown in {lJ that any mapping from n-tuples of weak 
orders into asymmetric binary relations is characterized by the 
binary constitution defined as follows. Let B = {(A,B)IA c N, B c N, - -
A n B • 0). Then a binary constitution is a mapping C : x@x - D + 26• 
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Any binary decision rule F is characterized by a binary 
constitution in the sense that there is one and only one C such that 
(1) xF(1T)y<-> ({i [ xP.y}, {i [yP.x}) eG(x,y). i i 
We next give two definitions which will help us characterize 
continuous binary decision rules by very simple constitutions. 
Definition: F is neutral on K.::, X@X if Vrr, n' e: n and V(x,y), 
(z,w) €: K, [xP.y¢¢- zP�w and yP.x� wP�z V i  E NJ� [xF('IT)y<;::;> zF('IT')w 1 1 1 l. 
and yF(1T)x«> wF(1T')z]. 
Definition: F is decisive on K .s:._ X@X if V'IT, 'IT1 E: Q and V(x,y) E: K, 
(xPiy_.,,, xPj_y V i  EN and xF(1T)y] � xF(1T')y. 
A binary decision rule is called simple on a subset K £ x@ X 
if there is a collection of subsets W of N such that for each (x,y) e: K, 
xF('IT)y�{i e:: N l xP.y} e:: W. It is easy to show that a binary decision i 
rule is neutral and decisive on K if and only if it is simple on K. 
We shall show, by considering localizations of the above 
concepts, that certain continuous-valued binary decision rules exhibit 
a local form of simplicity. We need the following definitions. 
Definition: F is decisive at (x,y) e:: x@x - D if VTI', 11'1 e: n, 
(xP .Y - xP'.y V i E N and xF(1T)y] -> xF(1T' )y. i i 
Definition: F is semi-neutral near (x2y) e x@x - D if there is a 
neighborhood U of (x,y) such that V(u,v) e U, [xP.y � uP�v and i i 
yPix � vP�u 'rf i e N] � [xF(1T)y � uF(1T')v]. 
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Definition: F is simple near (x.y) e: X © X - D if there is a collection 
W(x,y) of coalitions and a neighborhood TI of (x,y) such that V(u,v) e U, 
uF(1T)v <=:> {i e: NluP.v} e: W(x,y). A coalition A E W(x,y) is winning i 
for x against y. 
Definition: F is locally simple if it is simple near every (x,y) 
s x@x - n. 
The following lemma restates the above neutrality and 
decisiveness definitions in the language of binary constitutions 
and connects these concepts to local simplicity. 
Len:ana 1. Let C be the binary constitution corresponding to F. Then 
i) F is decisive at (x,y) <==> [(A,B) e: C(x,y) ->(A,B') e: C (x,y) 
V(A,B')E B]. 
ii) F is semi-neutral near (x,y) <-> 3 a neighborhood V of (x,y) 
such that V(u,v) e: V, C(x,y) "" C(u,v). 
iii) F is locally simple <=> V(x,y)e:: X ® X - D, F is decisive at 
(x,y) and semi-neutral near (x,y). 
Proof. i) and ii) are direct translations between the language of 
binary decision rules and the language of binary constitutions. 
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iil.): Let V(x,y) = {A.::_ N I (A,B) e C(x,y) � B s:_ N - A). Then 
V(x,y) e X@X - D, F locally simple<>- F simple near (x,y) .=::;:.. W(x,y) 
V(u,v) V (u,v) in a neighborhood V of (x,y) � F is decisive at (x,y) 
and Fis semi-neutral near (x,y). Conversely if Fis decisive at and 
semi-neutral near some (x,y) e: x@x - D, then i) and ii) show that 
Fis simple near (x,y), with W(x,y) = V(x,y). Hence Fis locally 
simple if F is decisive at and semi-neutral near every x e: X@X - D. 
Q.E.D. 
Throughout the next section we adopt a convenient shorthand 
method of representing a preference configuration TI. If, as will 
be usual, we want to have xPiy V i g A, yPix V i e B and 
xI. y V i e N - A U B, we shall write i 
A 1l. N - (A'UB) 
x y xy 
y x 
If in addition we want to have a sequence of points {un} converging to x 
in such a way that for n large enough, xP.un and u°P. yVieA , and i i 
xI. un Vie N - A, we shall write i 
A 
x 
[un] 
y 
1l. 
y 
x[un] 
N - (A U B) 
xy(u
n
] 
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Finally if a subset of individuals, A, is required to be indifferent 
among a subset Y of alternatives we shall write 
� 
(Y) 
III. MAIN RESULTS 
In this section we show that each member of a class of 
continuous-valued binary decision rules is locally simple and, under 
further topological restrictions, globally simple. We use several lemmas. 
Lemma 2: If Fis continuous-valued at (x,y) and (A,B) e C(x,y), B � B', 
and A n B' = �, then 3 a neighborhood V of (x,y) 3 (A,B') e C(u,v) 
V (u,v) e V for which u P x and v + y. 
Proof: Suppose not. Then 3 (x ,y ) + (x,y) 3 (A,B') ¢ C(x ,y ) Vn, n n n n 
x # x Vn, and y � y Vn. Condition Dl  applied to all members of A, B, n n 
and N - (AU B'), and condition D2 applied to all members of B' - B, imply 
that 3 TI e n and subsequences {u } of {x } and {v } of {y } such that n n n n 
A 
x [u ] 
and n 
y [v ] n 
1l. 
y [v J 
and n 
x [un] 
B' - B N - (AUB') 
[vn] xy and xy[un][vn] [un] 
Then vnRun V� � yRx, contrary to (A,B) e C(x,y) =a> xPy. 
Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 2 establishes the somewhat surprising result that if 
a binary decision rule is continuous-valued at a point (x,y) then it is 
"almost" decisive in most of a neighborhood of that point. The "almost" 
decisiveness of lemma 2 is a strong restriction on binary decision 
rules and many familiar choice processes, such as the simple majority 
rule described in example 2, fail to satisfy it. 
The remaining developments in this section have the purpose 
of strengthening the "almostn decisiveness at a point obtained in 
lemma 2 to simplicity near the point. The following weak version of 
monotonicity is both natural and useful in this endeavor. 
Definition: F is semimonotonic at (x,y) e:: x@x - D if (A,B) e:: C(x, y) 
==> (A,B') e:: C(x,y) for all B' £ B. F is semimonotonic if it is 
semimonotonic at all (x,y) e:: X © X - D. 
Theorem 1: Suppose that F is semi.monotonic at (x, y) E. x@x - D, 
that Fis continuous-valued, and that (A,B) e:: C(x,y). Then for 
any B' £ N - A, 3 a neighborhood V of (x, y) such that 
i) (A, B') E. C(u, v) V'(u,v) e:: V with u 1' x and v � y, and 
ii) (B', A) t C(v,u) V'(u,v) E: V. 
Proof: By lemma 2 and the definition of semimonotonic at (x,y), there 
exists V satifying i). To prove ii), let (u, v) E. V and choose 
(un, vn) e; V with un + u and vn + v, and u � u and v # v Vn. Condition n n 
Dl allows us to pick TI E n such that 
A 
u[un] 
v[vn} 
B' 
v[vn] 
u[un} 
Then by i) and continuity at (u,v), 
N - (A U B') 
uv[u ][v ] n n 
u�n =i;:.. u�vn...;:.. uRv ="" vPu � (B', A) t C(v, u). 
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Q.E. D. 
Part (i) of the theorem says that the first coordinates of the 
pairs in C(x,y) make up a set of winning coalitions for pairs (u, v) of 
alternatives in V for which u � x and v � y. In addition, (ii) says these 
coalitions are blocking at all (u, v) in V. To obtain the desired 
simplicity near (x,y) we must show that these coalitions are winning 
at any (u, v) e:: V. This requires one more condition on F. 
Definition: Fis strong without individual.indifference (SWII) at 
� 8 x@x - D if �A.<::. N (Ac, A) t C(y, x) => (A, Ac) 8 C(x, y). 
F is .§!ill. if it is SWII at each (x,y) e:: x@ X - D. 
This condition requires that a binary decision rule must 
state a preference between a pair of alternatives 'Whenever no individual 
is indifferent between the pair. Clearly this eliminates such 
procedures as absolute majority rule with n even. However, as real 
decision rules are expected to always choose between alternatives, 
SWII may not be requiring too much. 
Lemma 3: Suppose F is continuous-valued and SWII. Then 
(A, B) s C(x, y) .,,,;,. 3 a neighborhood V of (x, y) ;i (A, Ac) e:: C(u, v) V (u, v) e::V. 
In particular, (A, B) e C(x, y) =a> (A,Ac) e C(x�y). 
Proof: Let (u,v) E V where V is the neighborhood of theorem 1. By 
theorem l (ii) (Ac,A) ¢ C(v,u). Then SWII implies (A,Ac) 8 C(u,v). 
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Q.E.D. 
Theorem 2: If Fis semimonotonic at (x,y), and Fis continuous-valued 
and SWII, then Fis decisive at (x,y) and semi-neutral near (x,y). 
�: To get decisiveness at (x,y), consider (A,B) 8 C(x,y). By 
lemma 3 we have (A,Ac) E C(x,y). Semimonotonicity then implies that 
(A,B') E C(x,y) whenever A n  B' = �- By lemma 1 (i) Fis then decisive 
at (x,y). For semi-neutrality near (x,y), first note that 3 a neighborhood 
V of (x,y) such that (A,B) E C(x,y) � (A,Ac) E C(u,v) V (u,v) E V 
(lemma 3) � C(x,y) .':. C(u,v) V (u,v) e V (lemma 2). By lemma l (i) 
we need only to show that there exists a neighborhood V' of (x,y) 
such that C(u,v) £ C(x,y) V (u,v) EV'. Suppose not. Then 
n n  n n n n  3 tu ,v ) EV � u + x, v + y and C(u ,v ) 1_ C(x,y) 'r/n. 
Since N is finite 3 (A,B) t C(x,y) and a subsequence (xn,yn) of (un,vn) 
such that (A,B) E C(xn,yn). By semimonotonicity we also have (A,Ac) t 
C(x,y). By our choice of V, (A,Ac) g C(xn,yn). 
pick � g n such that 
!!o 
x[xn] 
y[yn] 
Ac 
y(yn] 
x[xn] 
Now Dl allows us to 
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c n u_ n... n n_n c Then (A,A ) E C(x ,y ) => x 11Y -> x. Ky => xRy """"> (A ,A) ¢ C(y ,x) ==> 
(A,Ac) e: C(x,y). This contradicts (A,Ac) t C(x,y). Hence C(u,v) <.;: C(x,y) 
V (u,v) in a neighborhood V' of (x,y). Intersecting V and V' and 
invoking lemma l (ii), we have F semi-neutral near (x,y). 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma l (iii) and theorem 2 together will imply that a 
continuous-valued, SWII, and semimonotonic F is locally simple. To 
provide a condition for F to be simple, we use the following lemma. 
(The lemma was suggested by Peter Hammond.) 
Lemma 4: Let K be a connected component of x@x - D. If F is 
semi-neutral near each (x,y) e: K, then F is neutral on K. 
Proof: For any (x,y) e K, define 
E(x,y) = {(w,z) e KjC(x,y) = C(w,z)}. 
Since Fis semi-neutral near each (w,z) e: E(x,y), E(x,y) is open in K 
by lemma 1 (ii). Because A= {E(x,y)l(x,y) e K} is a covering of the 
connected set K by open, disjoint sets, A must contain only one set, K. 
This proves that F is neutral on K. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 4 and theorem 2 immediately yield the main result. 
Theorem 3: Suppose F is continuous-valued, SWII, and semimonotonic. 
Then F is 
(i) locally simple, 
(ii) simple on any connected K � X@ X - D, and 
(iii) simple on x@x if x@x - D is connected. 
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Proof: Part (i) follows from lemma 1 (iii) and theorem 2. Theorem 2 
also implies that F is decisive. Hence F is simple on any subset of 
x@x on which F is neutral. Therefore (ii) follows from lemma 4. 
Part (iii) follows from (ii), since F is trivially neutral on x@x 
if F is neutral on x@x - D. 
Q.E.D. 
The following corollary provides a condition for F to be 
simple on x©x when X is in Rm. 
Corollary: Suppose that X .£. Rm is a connected set of full dimension, 
and that F is continuous-valued, SWII, and semimonotonic. If m > 1, 
then F is simple on X@ X. 
Proof: Fis trivially simple on x@x if it is simple on x@x - D. 
Hence, by theorem 3 (iii), we need only show that x@x - D is 
connected. Now, X@X is a connected set of dimension 2m. The 
diagonal D is the intersection of m orthogonal hyperplanes in R2m 
with X@X. Hence D is of dimension (2m - 1) - Cm - 1) = m. Now, 
x@x can be disconnected by the deletion of an affine subset only if 
the subset is of dimension at least dim cx@x) - 1 = 2m - 1. 
Since dim (D) ""m < 2m. - 1 for m > 1, x@x - D is connected 
for m > 1. 
Q.E.D. 
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The following example illustrates how F may not be simple 
on x@x if X £ i<:' and m = 1. Let X = [O, l], N = {l,2,3), and Q be 
the family of continuous weak orders on X. Define 
w1 = {{1,2), {1,3), {2,3), {1,2,3)), 
w2 = {{l}, {1,2), {1,3), {l,2,3)), and 
W(x,y) = {
W1 if O � 
w2 if o :::= 
x<y:=l 
y < x::: 1. 
Lastly, define F by xF('!T)y� {i e: N ! xP1y} E W(x,y). This Fis not 
simple on x@x, since W(x,y) is not invarian� on x@x - D. However, 
F is continuous-valued, SWII, semimonotonic, locally simple, and simple on 
the two connected components {(x,y)IO S x < y S 1} and 
{(x,y) 0 � y < x � 1). 
We conclude this section with a partial converse to theorem 3. 
Theorem 4: If F is locally simple and individual preferences are 
continuous, then F is semilllonotonic and continuous-valued. (Note that 
the domain n need not satisfy Dl and D2 for this theorem to hold.) 
Proof: F is semimonotonic because it is decisive. Hence we need to show 
only that F (7r) is continuous for any 7T en. Let (x,y) e X@X - D, and 
let W(x,y) be the collection of winning coalitions on a neighborhood V 
of (x,y). Let 7T be a profile of continuous preferences and suppose xPy. 
Then A= {i E NlxP.y} E W(x,y). For each i e A note that P. is an open i i 
set for which (x,y) e P. c x@x - D.· i -
Hence P is open in x@x - D. 
Then uPv for any (u,v) E n (P.nV). 
i€:A l. 
Q.E.D. 
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IV. ECONOMIC PREFERENCES 
In this section we show that when X is a convex subset of 
Rm, interpretable as a set of public commodity bundles, then standard 
assumptions on individual preferences imply Dl and D2. Specifically, 
let n be the set of binary relations on x that are reflexive, complete, 
transitive, continuous, and satisfy the convexity property 
c. xRy .,._ (tx + (1-t)y)Ry Vx � y, o < t < 1. 
Notice that C allows the interior of indifference sets to be nonempty. 
The preferences of n are representable by continuous utility functions 
that are quasiconcave, i.e., continuous functions u :  Rm+ R for which 
{x E X[u(x) � a} is convex V a e R. 
We must prove the following result. 
Lemma 5: Q satisfies Dl and D2. 
Proof: For any fixed p £ Rm, define the utility function u(w;p) to be 
u(w;p) = - (w-p) • (w-p). 
The preferences represented by u(w;p) are clearly in TI. Let (x,y) £ 
X@X - D. Let u1(w) = u(w;x), u2(w) = 0, and u3(w) = u(w;y). 
1 2 3 1 2 3 The preferences R , R , and R that correspond to u , u , and u 
satisfy the requirements of Dl. 
To show D2, let {(x ,y )} be a sequence converging to (x,y) n n 
such that x f. x Vn and Y if Y Vn. Define the line n n 
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L = {w < X!3 t E R l w = tx + (1-t)y}. 
Then three cases must be conside�ed: 
I. {nlxn e X-L} is infinite, 
II. {nly e X-L} is infinite, and n 
III. {nJ (x ,y ) < L@L} is infinite. n n 
�: In this case there exists p e irn-{O} such that (y-x) • p c 0 and 
{n] (x - x) • p > O} is infinite. n 
Without loss of generality assume (x - x) • p > 0 Vn. Define the n 
linear function 
u(w;x,p) (w - x) • p. 
The preference relation R represented by u(w;x,p) is inn. By the 
choice of p, xiy. For any n let 
n'(n) = min {mju(y ;x,p) < u(x ;x,p)}. m n 
Such an n' exists because u is continuous, ym + y, and u(y;x,p) = 
0 < u(x ;x,p). Letting v :::; y , ( ) , we now have x Pv Vn. Hence R n n n n  n n  
satisfies the requirements of D2. 
Case II: This case can be dealt with in the same way as was case I. 
Case III: We must break up this case into three subcases: 
II Ia. 
IIIb. 
IIIc. 
{nJ3t > 1 l x = tx + (1-t)y} is infinite n 
{nl3t < 0 l y = tx + (1-t)y} is infinite n 
lnJ3 tx and ty l 0 < t , t < 1 and l x = t x + (1-t )y x y n x x 
and y = t x + (1-t ) y} is infinite. n Y Y 
IIIa. We can assume that Vn 3 t > 1 3 x -- n n 
u(w) = max(O,(x-y) • (w-x)). 
t x + (1-t )y. Let n n 
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Then the preferences R represented by u(w) are in TI°, and xiy. Because 
u(x) =Ct -1) [l x-y J! 2 > 0 = u(y), u is continuous, and y + y, we n n n 
have xnPyn �n sufficiently large. Hence R satisfies D2. 
IIIb. We can assume that Vn 3 t < 0 3 y = t x + (1-t )y. n n n n 
u(w) = min(O,(x-y) • (w-y)). 
Let 
Then the preferences R represented by u(w) are in IT, and xiy. Because 
u(y ) "" t ll x-y l[ 
2 < 0 = u(x), u is continuous, and y + y, we have n n n 
xnPyn Vn sufficiently large. Hence R satisfies D2. 
IIIc. We can assume that Vn 3 0 < t , t < 1 such that xn Yu 
X m t X + n xn 
y = t x + n Yn 
(1-t )y, xn 
(1-t )y. 
Yn 
and 
Let p = l/2(x+y) and consider u(w;p) as defined above. The preferences 
R represented by u(w;p) are in "fi", and xiy. For any n let 
n'(n) = min{mlu(y ;p) < u(x ;p)}. m n 
The number n'(n) exists because u(xn;p) > u(x;p) = u(y;p), u is 
continuous, and ym + y. Letting vn � yn'(n)' we have xnpvn Vn. Renee 
R satisfies D2. 
Q. E. D. 
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We now illllll,ediately have 
Theorem 5: Suppose that X � 1f1 is convex, that F is SWII, semimonotonic, 
and U-continuous, and that n =TI. Then F is locally simple, and 
F is simple if m > 1. 
It seems to us that our results suggest that continuous-valued 
decision rules have a significantly "simpler" structure than has 
been generally suspected. Clearly the continuity axiom excludes some 
real decision procedures, as does SWII. However, our results may 
allow the application of the analytical machinery available for simple 
games to a wide class of decision procedures. 
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